With the popularity of the smart phones embedded in a large number of sensors, mobile crowd sensing (MCS) applications have developed rapidly. These applications often require the participants to collect the location-related data. However, this process faces the risk of the privacy leakage. The existing anonymous and cloaking methods can still analyze the user's identity and sensing locations by obtaining enough data with spatiotemporal correlation. In addition, the existing encryption methods not only take a lot of computation cost but also need to assume a full trusted sensing platform. In order to preserve the users' privacy, we need to separate the user's true identity and the sensing location. We propose a privacy-preserving method based on server-aided (or cloud-assisted) reverse oblivious transfer (ROT) protocol containing a cloud server which can compute the results of the encrypted sensing data to avoid the full trust in the sensing platform and enhance the computing efficiency in MCS. It overcomes the derivation of the malicious users in the standard malicious model through constructing the coefficients of the polynomial. Finally, the analysis demonstrates that the proposed method possesses the most efficient computing time, communication overhead and storage overhead comparing with other methods and can achieve the quality-privacy tradeoff optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile crowd computing and wireless sensor network are rapidly evolving. The MCS system [1] is a special mobile crowd computing system, where the task publishers can post their tasks to the online platform and the participants can utilize off-the-shelf, sensor-enabled mobile phones to provide the sensing service. This new sensing pattern is called people/human-centric sensing [2] , [3] which can be used in health care, environmental monitoring, intelligent transportation, urban management, social services and many other areas. A typical MCS system is usually composed of the task The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Xiaochun Cheng . publisher, the sensing platform and the mobile user. The task publishers release the sensing tasks, which include the budget constraints and the requirements of the sensing locations and the sensing period, to the sensing platform. The mobile users register with the sensing platform as potential participants to participate in the sensing tasks. After completing the sensing task, the participants upload the sensing data to the platform and obtain the rewards from the platform. Our method is mainly focused on the privacy protection in the stage where the users upload the sensing results to the sensing platform, which is also a hot spot of the current research, as shown in Fig. 1 . In order to achieve better service quality, the participants submit their sensing data including the sensing locations to the platform. In addition, the platform needs to match VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ the sensing results with the real identity of the participants, so that it can properly evaluate and pay the contributions of the participants accordingly. However, the participants do not want to share their location data with others in the process of the completing sensing task. Exposing the privacy directly affects the enthusiasm of participants to join the sensing task [4] . A recent survey [5] shows that 90 percent of people are concerned about their data privacy and 33 percent are unsure whether to register with their actual identities in the sensing platform. Therefore, The privacy-awareness should be considered in the MCS system to obtain the maximize profit by jointly optimizing the quality of the sensing data and the privacy metrics. Two types of methods are proposed to resolve the conflict between the platform's requirements of obtaining the participants' locations and preserving their location privacy. One of the main methods is to confuse the specific locations of the participants by cloaking or perturbation. This method disorders the correct location of the uploaded data. However, the platform pays rewards to the participants based on their exact data collected location and the true identity. Not knowing the accurate location may lead to the misjudgment of the participants' uploaded data and rewards distribution. Another way to achieve privacy protection is complex encryption which needs to assume that there is a trustful third party (TTP) to compute the public and private keys of the encryption method. TTP which is responsible for connecting locations and identifications is overly relied on in this method, where the participants may continue to worry about their privacy leaks [6] . Furthermore, TTP may become the single target to be attacked easily. In addition, a large amount of computational complexity is also a major factor restricting the practical application of the encryption method. Therefore, how to improve the defects of these two methods is the main problem to be solved in this paper. Moreover, none of the existing papers on MCS considers the problem of jointly optimizing the quality of the sensing reports and the privacy metric. This is also a practical demand of the privacy-preserving method.
The secure multi-party computation protocol is an important theoretical foundation and research branch in the field of modern cryptography. It considers the issue of the secure computing in the distributed computing scenarios. The security of the protocol is defined by an ideal/reality simulation paradigm, as shown in Fig. 2 . We deem the protocol secure, if any real-world attack can be simulated in the ideal world, that is, for any real-world adversary A, there is an adversary S in the ideal world, so that the executing input/output joint distribution of S in the ideal world is computationally indistinguishable from the executing input/output joint distribution calculation of A in real world. The secure two-party computation is a special case of the multi-party computing. Since there are only two parties, it has inherent advantages over multi-party computing. The most important is that it has higher efficiency. In the MCS system, the participants perform the sensing task and the sensing platform pays the rewards to them. Since the process mainly involves two sides, we can use a secure two-party computing model to describe it, where some of the cryptography basic tools such as oblivious transfer (OT) are used to achieve privacy protection during the task execution. However, the efficiency of the traditional OT protocols is still relatively low. Especially in the MCS system, there are many cases where the interactions need to be completed online in real time. The efficiency of the current protocols is far from meeting the application requirements.
In order to improve the computational efficiency, we introduce a cloud server which computes the quality of the encrypted sensing report submitted by the participants and sends the result to the sensing platform. In this process, the cloud server can obtain the encrypted sensing report. It does not know the actual content of the sensing data. Although the sensing platform obtains the participants' true registered identity, it does not know the sensing position of the participants. This separates the participant's identity and sensing locations. In addition, the cloud server's powerful computing capabilities can further improve the efficiency of the method. Finally, we prove that the communication rounds of the protocol and the computational complexity reach a constant level in the none-collusion malicious model. The quality-privacy tradeoff achieves the globally optimal. Our major contributions are summarized as follows: 1). To the best of our knowledge, our work constructs an efficient and practical ROT protocol based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman(DDH) assumption and applies it to the MCS system for the first time. The participants' privacy is protected in the non-collusive malicious model. In our proposed protocol, the sender only sends a group messages to the cloud server and the receiver respectively. The receiver computes the intermediate results of the partial coefficient and sends to the cloud server. Finally, the cloud server calculates the quality of the encrypted sensing results without decrypting the sensing data under the encrypted cloud data verification scheme and sends the computing results to the receiver. The receiver and the cloud server compute numerous modular exponentiations together. As a result, our proposed protocol improves the computational efficiency and lowers the complexity.
2). We introduce a cloud server to separate the participants' identity and sensing locations and avoid the full trust of the third-party servers. We give the formal proof of the security based on the ideal/real simulation paradigm for the protocol. The sender's input values and choices are protected against the cloud server and the receiver.
3). We theoretically and experimentally verify and analyze that the proposed method is the most efficient comparing with others and achieves the ideal quality-privacy tradeoff.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related works. Section III introduces the preliminaries of the security definition used in our proposed protocol. Section IV describes in details the proposed privacy-preserving method based on server-aided ROT protocol in MCS. Section V evaluates the performance of the proposed method by extensive experiments. Finally, section VI concludes the paper and the future work is given.
II. RELATED WORK
Compared with traditional wireless sensor networks, the number of the sensing nodes in the MCS networks is larger, multi-type, and wider in scope. The transmission of the sensing data is more diverse and a series of new challenges are caused by human participation, including data collection, data quality management, big data processing, resource optimization, privacy protection, incentive mechanisms and other issues. In particular, the privacy protection is currently a hot topic of research. Jing et al. [7] divided privacy protection methods into four categories: (1) encryption method; (2) anonymous method; (3) sensitive location hiding method; (4) cloaking region method. The authors in [8] , [9] used k-anonymous mechanisms to overcome the exposure of the real identity information caused by low user density. Beresford and Stajano [10] proposed a method of hiding identity information by frequently changing the anonymous information. However, if the opponents obtain a large amount of the spatio-temporal correlation sensing data, the adversaries can still associate the users' identity with their anonymous information to acquire their location information. Freudiger et al. [11] proposed to add anonymous users to a mixed area to protect their location information. The authors in [12] proposed a participant coordination framework, where the participants' location was only known by his neighbors, but not the platform. Chow et al. [13] proposed a spatial cloaking algorithm to blur the user's exact location into a cloaked area. The authors in [14] proposed a privacy-aware framework, where the participants submitted their data to the server by adjusting the sensing range. Long et al. [15] proposed a privacy preserving method based on Voronoi Polygon which formed a cloaked region to hide users identity by constructing the Voronoi diagram. However, the cloaking location of the uploaded data may lead to inaccurate checking results. In order to solve the problem, the encryption-based method is frequently used in the location privacy protection. Kamara and Papamanthou [16] proposed a searchable and dynamic symmetric encryption method which satisfies the computational requirements of structured encryption data in the cloud data. However, the existing searchable symmetric encryption algorithms allow only simple exact matches and they are far from being practical for the real applications, because all of them are too complicated and inefficient. The authors in [17] proposed a privacy protection method which applied time-lapse cryptography, where the platform published a public key and a private key to protect the participants' privacy. The authors in [18] proposed a multi-layered context-aware architecture, where the data was protected by encryption and authentication. However, the method which submits the encrypted sensing data to the sensing platform needs to completely trust a third party, which can obtain the participants' true identities and location information. In addition, the computational complexity of the complex encryption algorithm does not apply to the MCS sytem.
Recently, with the rapid development of the cloud computing, many complex calculations are outsourced to the cloud server to complete. In the cryptographic field, many methods, such as secure multiparty computation [19] , [20] , identity-based encryption [21] , attribute-based encryption [22] and other cryptographic methods [23] , [24] , are proposed based on cloud computing. However, the cloud-assisted server is not completely trustworthy. In other words, we must view it as honest-but-curious. The secure multiparty computation based on k-out-of-n OT is studied widely in many aspects. Chu and Tzeng [25] proposed efficient two-round kout-of-n OT protocols based on DDH assumption which can transfer strings. The protocol is secure against semi-honest receiver and sender. Camenish et al. [26] presented an fully simulatable adaptive k-out-of-n OT protocol based on the non-standard q-Power DDH assumption. Green and Hohenberger [27] also proposed a adaptive k-out-of-n OT protocol with full simulation based on the DBDH assumption. However, these protocols need numerous modular exponentiations and complex bilinear operations. Bing et al. [28] proposed two fully simulatable practical frameworks for cut-and-choose k-out-of-n OT based on DDH assumption with security against covert and malicious adversaries. However, when it simulates the corrupted party, the frameworks using the technique of cut-and-choose have error probability. Guo et al. [29] presented a two round k-out-of-n OT protocol based the n-BDHE, (f,n)-DHE and n-BSDH assumption against semi-honest adversaries. However, the protocol has numerous nodular exponentiations and complex bilinear operations. The large amount of computational cost makes the above protocols without the cloud server unsuitable for the MCS system.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In the paper, the MCS system mainly involves two parties: the sender and the receiver. In addition, we add a none-collusion honest-but-curious cloud server, which is responsible for providing additional computing power. Two parties of the MCS system can transmit and calculate data through ROT protocol, a completely simulatable two-party computing cryptographic tool. It achieves provable security in the none-collusion malicious model based on the ideal/real simulation paradigm. Meanwhile, by embedding the input value of the sender into the RAND function and completing the calculation process of the function in different parties, it achieves the protection of the sender's privacy. We introduce the preliminaries and definition of security used in our protocols as follow.
A. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
The OT protocol consists of two parties, the sender S and the receiver R. In the initial 1-out-of-2 OT (OT 1 2 ) protocol, S has two secret inputs (x 0 , x 1 ) and R has a choice bit σ ∈ 0, 1 [30] . After both parties execute the protocol, R gets the output x σ and S has no output. The security requires that S cannot know the selection messages of R and R gets only the value of its choice. Subsequently, (OT 1 2 ) is expanded k-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT k n ) [31] . Considering the most general case of (OT k n ), S holds n secret inputs (x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x n ) and R has k(k < n) input bits (σ 1 , · · · , σ k ) ∈ 0, 1, · · · , n − 1. After the protocol is completed, R obtains the corresponding k values (x σ 1 , x σ 2 , · · · , x σ k ) from n values and satisfies the above security.
B. DECISION DIFFIE-HELLMAN ASSUMPTION
Let G be a q-order group with generators g, where q is a prime. Given a quadruple (g, g α , g β , g γ ), where α, β, γ ∈ Z q , it determines whether γ ≡ α × β(mod q) is established. If the equation is true, the tuple is considered to be a Diffie-Hellman (DH) tuple, otherwise it is a non-DH tuple. The DDH assumption means that the following two general distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
For any DH tuple (w, x, y, z), there exists a value a ∈ Z q which satisfies y = w a , z = x a . RAND function has the following properties: 1). If the quadruple (w, x, y, z) is a DH tuple and satisfies that x = w a , z = y a , for u, v ← RAND(w, x, y, z) it holds that u a = v.
2). If the quadruple (w, x, y, z) is a non-DH tuple, the distributions (w, x, y, z, RAND(w, x, y, z)) and (w, x, y, z, g α , g β ) are equivalent, where α, β ∈ Z q .
It needs to satisfy that there is always a negligible function ε(n) for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D such that for every a ∈ {0, 1} * and n ∈ N ,
2). Fully simulated security definition. The definition of the security for the two-party computing under the malicious adversary model is mainly based on the ideal/reality simulation paradigm. The formal definition is given below:
, 1} * is a two-party computing function. π is a real two-party protocol. π is said to compute safely F under the malicious adversary model, if in a non-uniform probability polynomial time, the adversary A in the ideal model and the adversary A in the real model are computationally indistinguishable. That is to say, for each i ∈ {1, 2},
where x, y, z ∈ {0, 1} * satisfies |x| = |y| and n, m ∈ N .
IV. THE PROPOSED PRIVACY-PRESERVING METHOD
In this section, we first provide an overview of our proposed privacy-preserving method. A secure server-aided ROT protocol for the MCS system is constructed based on the DDH assumption. The rationality and the intrinsic characteristics of ideal function are demonstrated in the design of the protocol. Then, the correctness and the security of the protocol are proven in the standard malicious model. Furthermore, we analyse the efficiency of the proposed protocol and compare our result with the previous. Finally, The globally optimal quality-privacy tradeoff of the protocol is proven.
A. OVERVIEW
In the traditional OT protocol, the sender's input values are selected by the receiver's selection bits. After the completion of the protocol, the receiver R only gets the information he/her wants; the sender S does not know the choice of R, that is, S does not know which information is obtained by R. However, R does not know how to choose the real sensing information from n inputs sent by S in the MCS system. Therefore, the selection bit can only be specified by S, which is exactly the reverse of the OT protocol according to the selection bit. Furthermore, the aim of the protocol is to ensure the obliviousness security of the participants' privacy. We define this protocol as ROT protocol based on the DDH instantiation of the (k,n)-dual-mode cryptosystem, where S constructs n tuples satisfying that only k of them are DH tuples by using the technique of the oblivious polynomial evaluation. Concretely, S constructs a k-order polynomial whose roots are his/her choices and sends k coefficients of the polynomial to R and the cloud server respectively by constructing RAND function. Then R and the cloud server evaluate the polynomial obliviously and generate n tuples satisfying that only k of them are the DH tuples. At last, the cloud server can only obtain the desired k values S chooses. Unlike the OT protocol, after the completion of the ROT protocol, the cloud server only gets the information S chooses; R only obtains the computing results. In fact, the ROT protocol is easier to implement than the OT protocol and more suitable for the MCS systems with higher real-time requirements. The method specifically implements the privacy protection from the following aspects:
1) We assume that the sensing platform and the cloud server cannot collude. This assumption exists in many realities. Our method separates the participant's identity and sensing locations, which avoids the exposure of the participant's activity trajectory to the platform.
2) The protocol uses the cryptographic calculation operation of the OT protocol and constructs a polynomial embedded in the sender's input value. Then it distributes the calculation process of RAND function with the polynomial coefficients to varying parties, which improves the efficiency of protocol execution and the security of the protocol is proven.
3) The cloud server is only responsible for providing additional computing power or transmitting specific content in accordance with protocol instructions. For the sender's two different selection sets, {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k } and {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k }, the cloud server cannot distinguish the corresponding message copy in the polynomial time, and the encryption result of the input values unselected by the sender is indistinguishable from the random calculation. The protocol meets the sender's security requirement against both the cloud server and the receiver.
In the MCS system, in order to get more benefits, the adversaries want to obtain other participants' bidding and sensing data to adjust their strategies. Even worse, the malicious may obtain the evaluation of the sensing reports and the rewards. Since the quality evaluation of the sensing reports is based on location, the sensing platform needs to know the participant's true sensing location and identity. In fact, there is no fully TTP in reality. In order to protect the participants' privacy, we design a privacy-preserving method based on the server-aided ROT.
B. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SERVER-AIDED ROT PROTOCOL
The protocol involves a total of 3 parties: the sender S, the receiver R, and the cloud server. It requires a total of 3 rounds of interaction. First, S encrypts his/her choices by fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [32] which can comprehensively implement the calculation of encrypted cloud data where the symmetric key sk is generated by trusted certificate authority (TCA). Then S constructs a polynomial of the encrypted inputs and divides the coefficients of the polynomial into two parts. Then S sends the partial coefficients to R and the rest part is sent to the cloud server. After receiving the messages from S, R computes the intermediate results and sends them to the cloud server. Then the cloud server completes all operations of the RAND function and computes the quality of the sensing results (QSR) through FHE scheme without decrypting the sensing data. Finally, R obtains the QSR results of the participants from the cloud server. The architecture of the proposed method is illustrated in Fig. 3 . In this paper, in addition to the sensing platform (receiver) and the participants (sender), the MCS system also contains a cloud server, which guarantees the following four points:
1). The authentic information of S is confidential to the cloud server;
2). The selection information of S is confidential to R; 3). The cloud server can only obtain k encrypted values selected by S, while other inputs from S do not have any relevant information. 4). TCA is trustworthy and non-collusive with the sensing platform and the cloud server.
In the server-aided ROT protocol based on DDH assumption, S uses the DH tuples to transmit the selected sensing information and other unselected is transmitted by the non-DH tuples. In other words, S constructs n tuples and satisfies that there are k DH tuples and the rest are non-DH tuples. In order to construct non-repudiation, we ask S to construct a k-order polynomial and set its own selected values as the roots of the polynomial. More concretely, the polynomial
, · · · , f (σ k )) are S's selected values. Then R and the cloud server can calculate RAND function result together. Note that most of the calculation tasks for polynomials are outsourced to the cloud server in the protocol. Regarding the communication cost and the modular exponentiations VOLUME 7, 2019 computed by the parties, S transfers k+2 sets of elements to R and the cloud server respectively and computes k+2 exponentiations. R computes 4n-1 exponentiations inall and sends them to the cloud server. Therefore, the computational complexity of our protocol is just O(n + k), which is superior to O(nk) of some other OT protocols. Next, We define an ideal function F ROT in an ideal environment, as shown below. We believe that an ideal adversary A can break the polynomial and get n roots of the polynomial, but A cannot obtain the roots of k sensing data selected by the sender, nor can he/she get the important private information, such as the symmetric key. In an ideal environment, the ideal adversaries cannot interact directly with the participants. They must get the information through the ideal function.
The receiver R and the cloud server have no input.
• Auxiliary input: S has a security parameter 1 n and a group G of prime q-order with a generators g 0 .
• Output: S outputs ⊥. R outputs the intermediate result.
The cloud server outputs the QSR result. 1). After S completes the sensing task, F ROT sends the partial sensing result to cloud server. Then, the cloud server sends the intermediate result to A.
2). F ROT sends the residual sensing result to A.
3). After receiving all the values, A gets k values specified by S.
Ideally, if only the cloud server is corrupted, the adversary A cannot get all k values. Furthermore, if both cloud server and R are corrupted, the adversary A cannot obtain get all k values either.
The formal description of the server-aided ROT protocol π ROT is as follows: 1). S receives the sensing task with the requirement descriptions and the symmetric key. After completing the sensing task, based on the symmetric key sk and the sensing data D = (d 1 , d 2 , · · · , d k ), S generates the encrypted data E(D) = {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k }.
2). S chooses randomly a k-order polynomial f (
For arbitrary i = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1, S computes c i = (g 0 ) a i . Then it sends c 0 , c 1 to R and c 2 , c 3 , · · · , c k−1 to the cloud server. In addition, S chooses randomly y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ∈ Z q and sends them to the cloud server and R respectively. Then it chooses randomly a σ i ∈ {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k } to compute g = (g 0 ) y σ i γ and h = g β , where γ ∈ Z q . And then S sends (g, h) to the cloud server.
3). We mark g 1 = (g 0 ) y 1 , · · · , g n = (g 0 ) y n . R computes ((g a j 0 )) y i = (g i ) a j , where i = 1, 2, · · · , n, j = 0, 1. Then, R computes the following matrix:
where t i ∈ Z q and i = 1, 2, · · · , n. With the symmetric key sk and the keyword set Q that calculates the QSR result for a specific task, R sends
, · · · , (v R n , t n )) to the cloud server. 4). Similarly, we mark g 1 = (g 0 ) y 1 , · · · , g n = (g 0 ) y n . After the cloud server receives (c 2 , c 3 , · · · , c k−1 ), it first checks whether the number of elements is k-2. If not, the protocol is stopped. Likewise, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, j = 2, 3, · · · , k − 1, the cloud server computes ((g a j 0 )) y i = (g i ) a j . Finally, the cloud server computes the following matrix:
And then let f 2 (x) = a 2 x 2 + a 3 x 3 + · · · + a k−1 x k−1 + x k , for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, the cloud server computes g 
According to the definition of RAND function, for arbitrary i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , n, the cloud server computes
. For a randomly selected σ m in step 2), the cloud server computes
For every σ j ∈ {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k }, where σ j = σ m , the cloud server computes
7). Finally, the cloud server computes the QSR results of the encrypted sensing data X = {x σ 0 , x σ 1 , · · · , x σ k } and sends them to R. The calculation of QSR is described in detail in the subsection F.
C. THE CORRECTNESS OF THE SERVER-AIDED ROT PROTOCOL
We firstly analyse the correctness of the server-aided ROT protocol. Assuming that all the parties perform honestly the protocol, the cloud server can obtain k values specified by the sender S. In the ROT protocol, we can obtain k roots
The cloud server can compute the values transferred by the DH tuples. We analyze the correctness of the protocol from three aspects as follows:
is a DH tuple. Thus, we have that
2).
is also a DH tuple and (g σ m )
3). When each i / ∈ {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k }, f (i) = β, we have that w i
In summary, the cloud server can only obtain k encrypted values specified by the sender S.
D. THE SECURITY OF THE SERVER-AIDED ROT PROTOCOL
We first give a formal security proof of the protocol based on the security definition in part D of section III, and then analyze and show that the sender's privacy is protected against the honest-but-curious and independent cloud server and the receiver. Intuitively, because the DDH problem is difficult in group G, the corrupted sender cannot effectively construct the DH tuples and the non-DH tuples, and the corrupted receiver cannot distinguish the DH tuple. We give the proof and the analysis of the security for protocol by four theorems as follows: Theorem 1: Assuming that the DDH problem is difficult in group G, the protocol π ROT securely realizes the ideal function F ROT under the malicious adversary model according to the security definition in part D of section III.
Proof: We separately prove the security under the malicious adversary model when the receiver and the cloud server are corrupted. 1). The receiver is corrupted. Let A be an adversary that controls the receiver in real world. We construct a simulator S RECE as the cloud server in an ideal model to invoke the inputs and work of the adversary A as follows:
Step 1: The sender S sends the partial sensing result to A, the residual sensing result to S RECE .
Step 2: A sends the intermediate result to S RECE Step 3: After receiving all the values, S RECE gets k values specified by S.
2). The cloud server is corrupted. Let A be an adversary that controls the cloud server in real world. We construct a simulator S SEND as the receiver in an ideal model to invoke the inputs and work of the adversary A as follows:
Step 1: The sender S sends the partial sensing result to S RECE , the residual sensing result to A.
Step 2: S RECE sends the intermediate result to A
Step 3: After receiving all the values, A gets k values specified by S.
The above is the ideal simulation process where the receiver and the cloud server are corrupted. We want to prove that the joint output distribution performed by the adversary A and the simulator S RECE in an ideal world is computationally indistinguishable from that generated by the adversary A and the honest sender S in the real protocol, that is IDEAL F ROT ,S RECE (z),R ((x 1 , · · · , x n , σ 1 , · · · , σ k ), n, k) c ≡ REAL π ROT ,A(z),R ((x 1 , · · · , x n , σ 1 , · · · , σ k ), n, k).
The analysis of the above simulation process reveals the only difference from the real protocol implementation is that the simulator differs from the honest receiver and the honest cloud server in receiving the values. To be specific, the simulator does not get the all input values of S, so for those values that are not obtained, the simulator can only use the random elements in group G to calculate the result. However, we can find that for those values, the corresponding tuples used to generate RAND function in the real protocol are all non-DH tuples. Therefore, if it can distinguish between A and S RECE , then there is an environment machine Z that can construct a probability polynomial time algorithm ε which can distinguish the DH tuples. However, according to the nature of RAND function, the result produced by the non-DH tuple through RAND function has the same distribution as any element in group G. In a probability polynomial time, it cannot distinguish between IDEAL and REAL. In view of this, we say that the above two joint output distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
Theorem 2: If the cloud server is honest-but-curious and independent from the receiver R, the protocol meets S's security requirement against both the cloud server and R.
Proof: In our proposed protocol, after constructing a k-order polynomial f (x) = (x −σ 1 )(x −σ 2 ) · · · (x −σ k )+β = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + x k , where β ∈ Z q and {σ 1 , · · · , σ k } are the choices of the sender, S sends partial coefficients of the polynomial to R and the cloud server by the encrypted form, respectively. What we will prove is that neither R nor cloud server can deduce the roots of f (x) after receiving these messages. As shown in the protocol, S divides k-order polynomial into f 1 (x) and f 2 (x), and then the coefficient of f 1 (x) = a 0 + a 1 x is encrypted as (g a 0 0 , g a 1 0 ) to send to R, and that of f 2 (x) = a 2 x 2 +a 3 x 3 +· · ·+a k−1 x k−1 +x k is encrypted as (g a 2 0 , g a 3 0 , · · · , g a k−1 0 ) to send to the cloud server. Since the polynomial f (x) satisfies that f (σ 1 ) = · · · = f (σ k ) = β, there are k values equal to g β 0 among (g
may not have this property. Assuming that there exist two values i, j ∈ (1, 2, · · · , n) satisfying that g f 2 (i) 0 = g f 2 (j) 0 , because the cloud server doesn't know f 1 (x) and then it can't make sure whether g
Thus, for i, j ∈ (1, 2, · · · , n), the cloud server can only guess randomly whether i, j ∈ {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k } or not. Similarly, R cannot guess the sender's choice. We omit this detailed description. In conclusion, R and the cloud server cannot obtain S's selected values using their own information alone. The sender's privacy is protected against R and the cloud server. The proof ends.
Theorem 3: If the DDH assumption holds in group G, the receiver R and the cloud server are honest-but-curious and independent, the protocol meets S's security requirement against the cloud server.
Proof: In the third stage of the protocol execution, the cloud server obtains n tuples, of which k tuples are DH tuples and n-k tuples are non-DH tuples. The cloud server computes
Assuming that the cloud server can get some extra information about S's choice, it means that the cloud server knows whether the tuples are DH tuples or non-DH tuple. Therefore, we construct a polynomial-time machine D, which calls the cloud server as a subroutine to solve the DDH problem. We firstly define two selection sets C and C , where C = {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k } and C = {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k }. We define the view of the cloud server in the protocol as a copy of the message sent by the sender to the cloud server and denote as V C , where C is the sender's choice set. According to the protocol, we know that V C = ((g, h) , (g 1 , h 1 ), · · · , (g n , h n )),
(1, 2, · · · , n). Assuming that the sender's selected set is C, then the k tuples ((g σ 1 , g, h σ 1 , h), (g σ 2 , g, h σ 2 , h), · · · , (g σ k , g, h σ k , h)) are DH tuples. Similarly, if the choice set is C , the tuples ((g σ 1 , g, h σ 1 , h), (g σ 2 , g, h σ 2 , h), · · · , (g σ k , g, h σ k , h)) are non-DH tuples. Let σ m ∈ C and σ m / ∈ C . When the choice set is C, the tuple T C = (g σ m , g, h σ m , h) is a DH tuple. It's clear that the tuple T C = (g σ m , g, h σ m , h) is a non-DH tuple when the choice set is C'. Since the number of the tuples does not affect the computational indistinguishability of the DDH problem, distinguishing the distribution of V C and V C just needs to differentiate whether T C is a DH tuple. If the cloud server can distinguish the distribution of V C and V C with a non-negligible probability ρ, we can construct a polynomial-time distinguisher D to solve the DDH problem by calling the cloud server as its own subroutine with the probability of at least ρ −2/q. This is obviously contradictory to the DDH problem. Thus, V C and V C are computationally indistinguishable. The proof ends.
Theorem 4: If the DDH assumption holds in group G, the receiver R and the cloud server are honest-but-curious and independent, the protocol meets S's security requirement against R.
Proof: Firstly, when R receives the message from S, it tries to maliciously construct a polynomial f (x) to satisfy f (1) = f (2) = · · · = f (n) = β, so that the k tuples selected by S can be recovered. However, the tuples constructed by R are not DH tuples. Next we prove that R cannot get extra values from non-DH tuples.
According to the nature of RAND function, if (w, x, y, z) is a non-DH tuple, the result of RAND(w, x, y, z) is random in group G. Assuming that S's inputs are (σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k ), for each j / ∈ (σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ k ), the corresponding tuple (g j , g, h j , h) is a non-DH tuple. Without loss of generality, we randomly choose a and b from Z q to make h j = (g j ) a and h = g b , where a = b. In order to prove that the result of RAND(g j , g, h j , h) is random in group G, we should simply indicate Pr[RAND(g j , g, h j , h) = (g α 0 , g
where s, t ← Z q are random, the above probability comes from the randomness of s and t. Let g = (g j ) θ , where θ ← Z q is random, then the tuple (g j , g, h j , h) can be expressed as (g j , (g j ) θ , h j , (g j ) θ ×b ) and RAND(g j , g, h j , h) = ((g j ) s+a×t , (g j ) s×θ+θ ×b×t ). Therefore, for the following equations then there exists a pair of values, s and t satisfying that the above equations are established. Because s and t are selected independently and randomly from Z q by the probability 1 q 2 , the probability that the equations have a solution is 1 q 2 , which implies that the result of non-DH tuple RAND(g j , g, h j , h) is random in group G. In other words, S's unselected input values is indistinguishable from the random values in group G. The proof ends.
In summary, we complete the security proof of the server-aided ROT protocol.
E. THE EFFICIENCY OF THE SERVER-AIDED ROT PROTOCOL
Now, we compare the efficiency of our proposed method with that of several known multi-party OT protocols. Our proposed method needs exactly 3 communication rounds. The first round is that the sender S transfers messages to the receiver R and the cloud server respectively. In the second round, R sends the computing intermediate values to the cloud server. Finally, the cloud server calculates the QSR results and sends them to R. The specific exponentiation calculations in each round are as follows: 1). S computes k+2 exponentiations in all, in which k is to compute ((g 0 ) a 0 , (g 0 ) a 1 , · · · , (g 0 ) a k−1 ), and 2 is for the values g = (g 0 ) y σm r and h = g β .
2). R computes 4n-1 exponentiations overall, in which 2n is to compute the following matrix:
n-1 is to compute ((c 1 ) y 2 ×2 2 , (c 1 ) y 3 ×3 2 , · · · , (c 1 ) y n ×n 2 ) and n is to compute (h R i ) t i . Such as g a × g b , the computational complexity of the multiplication of the two group exponents can be optimized to 1.25 exponential operations, so the above operations can be combined into this form, i.e., (c 0 ) y i × (c 0 ) y i ×i , where i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Therefore, the number of R's exponentiations can be reduced to 3.25n.
3). The cloud server computes 2(k+1)n+1 exponentiations in total, in which (k − 1)n is to compute the following matrix:
(c k−1 ) y 1 (c k−1 ) y 2 · · · (c k−1 ) y n (g 0 ) y 1 (g 0 ) y 2 · · · (g 0 ) y n and (k − 1)(n − 1) is to compute the following matrix:
What's more, the cloud server spends 4n exponentiations to calculate (h server i ) t i and (u i , w i ) and 1 exponentiation is used to compute the QSR result.
Finally, we count the number of the group elements sent by each party in the proposed method: 1). The sender S sends two group elements ((g 0 ) a 0 , (g 0 ) a 1 ) to the receiver R and k group elements ((g 0 ) a 2 , (g 0 ) a 3 , · · · , (g 0 ) a k−1 , g, h) to the cloud server.
2). The receiver R sends only 2n elements (v R 1 , t 1 ), (v R 2 , t 2 ), · · · , (v R n , t n ) to the cloud server. 3). The cloud server sends 1 result element to R. We compare our proposed method with the method of [27] , [33] - [35] in Table 1 . In [27] , the protocol is based on pairing, such that it needs two values to describe the exponentiation cost. Zeng et al. [33] proposed a practical framework for k-out-of-n OT without the cloud server. Therefore, a large number of group exponentiation operations are required for the sender and the receiver. Wei et al. [34] proposed a practical server-aided OT protocol where most of the group exponentiation operations are outsourced to two cloud servers, thereby it reduced the exponentiations cost of the sender and the receiver. Zhao et al. [35] proposed a method using only a cloud server to improve the efficiency of [34] . Our proposed server-aided ROT protocol uses less exponentiation operations and interactive rounds in MSC system with a cloud server. Therefore it has higher efficiency. 
F. THE QUALITY-PRIVACY TRADEOFF OF THE SERVER-AIDED ROT PROTOCOL
Finally, we analyze the quality-privacy tradeoff of the proposed methods. In MCS system, the rewards of the participants are correlated with the utility of the sensing reports and QSR which is inversely proportional to the privacy metrics [36] . Therefore, the quality-privacy tradeoff must be considered. We propose the definition of the privacy metrics r of the sensing reports collected from the participants based on the entropy theory [12] , which is a measure of unpredictability in information theory. In order to ensure that QSR is maximized, we need to select the participants by optimizing r and lower incentive requirements. QSR S(P, r) is determined by the expected payment P and the privacy metric r of each participant. When the malicious adversaries obtain the sensing reports under equal probability so that they cannot identify the owner of the sensing reports, we consider that r is maximized. Therefore, r depends on the distribution of the probabilities for the sensing reports in a specific location and a time slot. The actual privacy metric can be denoted as:
where L is a set of the sensing task in the specific location and time slot, X is a sample keyword of the sensing data sent by the sensing platform to the cloud server, F c is a computational method about the encrypted cloud data based on FHE algorithm, x i is a set of the encrypted sensing reports submitted by the participant. Then we can calculate the utility function U (·) of the sensing reports, which needs to meet the following empirical assumptions:
• U (·) is nonnegative. This is rational as QSR of the sensing reports cannot be negative.
• U (·) is inversely proportional to r ∈ [0, 1] such that ∂U (·) ∂r < 0. This empirical assumption is required as QSR decreases while r increases [37] .
• U (·) is convex and decreases at an increasing rate over r such that ∂ 2 U (·) ∂r 2 < 0. This assumption reflects the empirical change of QSR at different r.
Based on these empirical assumptions, we propose the following utility function:
where α 1 , α 2 and α 3 are the curve fitting parameters of the utility function to real-world experiments, i.e., the ground truth. Big data platforms, e.g., Apache Mahout [38] and MLlib [39] , can be used for running the real-world experiments at scale. In particular, the set A of the real-world experiments (r i , S(P, r) i ) A are executed at different privacy metrics r i resulting in the real-world varying QSR S(P, r) i , where r (i+1) > r i ≥ 0. α 1 , α 2 and α 3 are obtained by minimizing the residuals of a nonlinear least squares fitting as follows:
The best fitting parameters α can be found by iterative solving in the above formula [40] . The sensing platform expects to pay the rewards P for the specific task and collects the sensing data from the participant at a privacy metrics r. QSR S(P, r) can be denoted mathematically as:
where M is the number of tasks released by the platform in a specific location and time slot while N is the number of tasks completed by a participant, P represents the expected payment for a specific task determined by the platform. QSR is the difference between the total benefit and the total lost data cost, where the first part of (9) defines the total benefit resulting from offering the server at a utility and the total lost data cost is defined in the second part of (9) to be inversely proportional to the probability of the true data. This is rational as QSR and the privacy metrics are inversely proportional.
That is, QSR decreases when the privacy metric increases. The problem of QSR maximization can be formulated as follows: maximize : S(P, r)
where B is the total budget of a specific task. (10) is to maximize QSR by jointly optimizing the privacy metrics, the budget and the payment. According to the constraints C1 and C2, we can ensure nonnegative solution of r and P ≤ B respectively. We next provide the analytical solution (P * , r * ) of this QSR maximization problem and prove their global optimality. We construct a Lagrangian dual function for (10) based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions which meet the primal-dual optimality of the concave function [41] . The Lagrangian dual function can be denoted as follows:
where λ 1 ≥ 0 and λ 2 ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints P and r respectively. Proposition 1: The analytical solution P * and r * of (10) can be denoted as:
where λ 1 = λ 2 = 0. Proof: In order to prove the correctness of the proposition, we derive (14) and (15) in regard to P and r from (7) and (9) as follows:
∂L(P, r, λ 1 , λ 2 ) ∂r = Np + λ 2 − M α 2 α 3 P 2 e α 3 r (α 1 − α 2 e α 3 r ) 2 . (15) We set (14) and (15) to zero and calculate the result of the two formulas to derive the analytical solution of (10). The proof ends.
Proposition 2: S(P, r) is concave and the analytical solution P * and r * expressed in (12) and (13) are globally optimal.
Proof: According to [40] , We can show that the Hessian matrix of S(P, r) is negative semidefinite by utilizing Sylvester's criterion as a sufficient condition. Therefore, the concavity of S(P, r) can be derived. Let H S denote the Hessian matrix of S(P, r), we have (16) , as shown at the bottom of this page.
Let D 1 and D 2 denote the leading principal minor of H S , if −D 1 ≥ 0 and D 2 ≥ 0, H S is negative semidefinite. The leading principal minors of H S can be denoted as follow:
where we substitute negative D 1 for D 1 and consider that the utility of the sensing reports is non-negative in the above empirical assumptions. Therefore, H S is negative semidefinite and S(P, r) is concave. The analytical solution P * and r * given in the (12) and (13) are globally optimal through the concavity. The proof ends.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We firstly use the real-world datasets to train three different experiments S1, S2 and S3. Then, We analyze the performance of the protocol utilizing deep learning [42] and random forests [43] as the clustering algorithms to assign the sensing tasks. We design the following MCS system experiments by using the real-world ParticipAct and MDC Nokia datasets as shown in Fig. 4 . These two datasets provide the real results of the user participation in the MCS activities. They have the features of four dimensions. The first is the higher mobility in terms of frequency of contacts; the second is the lower heterogeneity of contacts; the third is the lower connectivity in terms of contact duration; the last is they are rich in the available sensing data. The datasets well capture the occasional encounters among people in a city and simulate the usages of smartphones by a large number of users throughout the day. Therefore, we developed three experiments with the different task assignment methods where the datasets mix the different information sources to evaluate the performance of our proposed method. All experimental results are averaged after at least 1000 rounds. • Experiment S1 (task assignment using deep learning): We develop an experiment by using the ParticipAct dataset [44] which reproduces the mobility of 173 students in the Emilia Romagna region of Italy. The ongoing data collection activities began in December 2013. In this work, we consider the data of 15 months starting from December 2013 to February 2015. The participants using the android smartphones with MCS application run dynamically the assigned tasks. The application uses the Google location APIs to track the device's location (by merging GPS and WiFi hotspot coordinates for greater accuracy and higher precision). The sampling scan period is 150 seconds. The participants send the messages which typically include their identity and location information in the experiment. Therefore, the privacy protection is reasonably required. We use 869,725 message samples for model training and 536,216 for model testing and QSR calculation. We set the number of the participants L=170 and the number of the tasks M=5 and assume that the payment of each participant is 2$. We bundle the different information into the dataset to evaluate our proposed method • Experiment S2 (task assignment using random forests): This experiment uses a random forest classifier instead of deep learning to achieve the above experiment S1.
• Experiment S3 (task assignment using random forests): We develop an experiment using the MDC Nokia dataset [45] which was collected from 2009 to March 2011 and involved 185 users in the Lake Geneva region. The user carried a Nokia N95 phone, and the application periodically collected data such as Bluetooth sightings, visited places, GPS, phone calls, SMS and other sensor data. The sampling period for all acquired data (including GPS and Bluetooth tracking) is 600 seconds. We select a time series of 1,120,000 data points from the MDC Nokia dataset, and then according to the 32,122 samples training and 6,538 samples testing, we cluster the participants into different groups to assign tasks and mix some sensing information into the datasets to implement our method. We also set the number of the participants L=185 and the number of the tasks M=5 and assume that the payment of each participant is 2$.
In order to evaluate the performance of our method, we choose PPDRC method [46] and DP-GRB method [47] to carry on the contrast experiment with the data of experiment S1. The methods of comparison are location-based privacy protection methods in MCS system. The main performance values to be compared include: computation overhead, communication overhead, storage overhead. Fig. 5 shows the key generation overhead of TCA which increases with the increasing number of users. Since PPDRC method requires a different key for each user, we can observe that its key generation overhead increases dramatically as the number of users increases. DP-GRB and our method generate keys at relatively short notice and the overhead is less. As shown in Fig. 6 , we can observe that the sensing data encryption overhead of the users increases with the increasing number of the tasks. PPDRC method uses the searchable symmetric encryption method which is too complicated and inefficient, and its data encryption overhead is maximum. Since our method requires constructing a polynomial, the sensing data encryption overhead is more than that of DP-GRB method. Fig. 7 illustrates the communication overhead from the user to the cloud server. The communication overhead of PPDRC method is much higher than that of DP-GRB and our method. In our method, the user transmits the ciphertext to the sensing platform and the cloud server. The communication overhead depends only on a round of communication, that is, the user sends only the ciphertext to the cloud server, so it is close to that of DP-GRB method. Fig. 8 compares the storage overhead of the three methods in the cloud server. As shown in Fig. 8 , as the number of users increases, the storage overhead of our method and DP-GRB method maintains a slower growth, while PPDRC method increases dramatically as the number of users increases. The storage overhead of PPDRC method is much higher than that of our method and DP-GRB method.
In conclusion, compared with others, our method has higher computation efficiency, lower communication overhead and storage overhead.
Next, we analyze and evaluate the performance of our proposed method from the aspects of quality-privacy tradeoff, which is based on the analytical solution of the quality-privacy optimality problem. The experiment introduces the impacts of QSR on the privacy metrics r, the expected payment P, the budget B and the number of the participants.
As shown in Fig. 9 , we can obtain three major results according to the quality-privacy models of S1, S2, and S3, respectively. First, when the privacy metric increases, QSR decreases. This is obvious that the sensing reports have a higher distortion as the privacy metric increases. Second, noted that the real data fits the QSR function defined in (9) . Third, due to the different data analytic algorithms, QSR of S1 and S2 are different even though they use the same dataset.
In Fig. 10 , We evaluate the QSR maximization model under the varied privacy metric r and the expected payment P by using S1. As shown in Fig. 11 , when the payment is high and the privacy metric is low, QSR increases. We can observe that QSR falls down due to the low payment. Similarly, a high privacy metric results in a low QSR. However, we cannot simply assume that the higher payment and the lower privacy metric results in a higher QSR. According to the analytical solutions of (12) and (13) and the experiments results, we can obtain the optimal settings of the payment and the privacy FIGURE 9. QSR prediction of the experiment S1, S2, and S3 under different privacy metrics. metric, that is P * = 1.62 and r * = 0.62. Then, the maximum QSR is calculated as S(P, r) = 0.959 by (9) .
In Fig. 11 , we consider the impact of the varying payment of the participants on QSR, the privacy metric and the budget. We can obtain two important results from Fig. 11 . First, there is a positive correlation between the payment and QSR. Specifically, when the payment increases up to P=1.62, FIGURE 10. QSR of S1 under different the payment and privacy metric. QSR increases accordingly. When the platform continuously decreases the privacy metric as defined in (13), the increasing payment P yields a stable rise of QSR until P = 1.62. Besides, similarly, we can observe that QSR is inversely correlated with the privacy metric.
In Fig. 12 , it shows the impact of QSR, the privacy metric and the payment under varied number of participants. When the number of the participants increases, QSR and the payment increase due to the benefit of the increased demand. Moreover, the platform decreases the privacy metric to collect more true data which increases QSR. The privacy metric increase negatively affects QSR and reduces the participants' interest in the sensing task. When the privacy metric decreases, QSR begins to rise. In addition, the payment will decrease when the privacy metric is high. However, the platform wishes to increase the payment to attract more participants to improve QSR within a given budget limit. Meanwhile, the platform tries to find a best trade-off value among privacy, QSR and payment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a server-aided ROT protocol based on the standard DDH assumption in the cloud computing environment to protect the participants' privacy in MCS system. The correctness and the security of the proposed protocol is proved without assuming a fully trusted third party. There are only three rounds of communications. In the first round, the sender sends the coefficients of the polynomial to the cloud server and the receiver respectively. In the second round, the receiver sends the intermediate computing results to the cloud server. In the last, the cloud server sends the QSR results to the receiver. The performance evaluation shows that our proposed privacy protection method is the most efficient comparing with other known ones and it achieves provable security in the standard malicious model. Furthermore, we verify that the quality-privacy tradeoff achieves global optimum. In further research work, we will mainly consider to construct the information metrics index to calculate the quality difference of data before and after privacy protection to evaluate the privacy protection effect.
